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ABSTRACT 
 Recently we have observed cooperation between trade blocs as the European Union, the 
Andean Community, Mercosur, ASEAN and others. These actors have started to negotiate a 
possibility of trade agreements between each other. What did provoke regional trade blocs to form 
and proliferate this kind of arrangements in trade? How it can be explained through a theoretical 
standpoint of international relations? I attempt to answer for these questions in this paper. 
Generally, the research constructs an explanation for the formation of interregional trade 
agreements through bargaining theory by emphasizing the roles of trade gains, depth of integration 
within a bloc, a level of developments, membership and disputes history in the WTO. The results 
demonstrate positive and significant influence of trade gains, depth of integration and membership 
in the WTO, while disputes history affected significantly but negatively interregional cooperation. 
There is an important implication for policy-makers in applying this information for calculation of 
possible trade agreements between blocs. 
 
INDEX WORDS: regional trade blocs, interregional trade agreement, interregional 
cooperation, inter-blocs cooperation, trade gains, depth of integration, a 
level of development, the World Trade Organization, disputes history  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The trading tendencies have gradually progressed during the past two decades. There have 
emerged many trade agreements in various forms and types, as preferential trade agreements, 
free trade areas, customs union, common market and fiscal and monetary unions (Mansfield 
and Milner 1999; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). The most notable feature in these processes 
is that a vast majority of trade arrangements were concluded by countries individually within 
one particular region, which led to the formation of regional trade blocs (Mansfield and Milner 
1999; Bajo 1999; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2003; Szegedy-
Maszak 2009; Boyer and Schuschny 2010). The common reasons among countries in forming 
regional trade blocs were obtaining access to market and trade gains, strengthening domestic 
policy reform, increasing multilateral bargaining leverage, establishing strategic multilateral 
connections with trade partners (Whalley 1998; Mansfield and Milner 1999; Mansfield and 
Reinhardt 2003; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2013). As the best examples of the agreements, 
European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Andean Community 
can be undoubtedly considered. Consequently, these blocs have been starting to negotiate on 
trade agreements with each other and to form interregional trade institutions. This trend is 
important for exploration, as regional trade blocs have a huge influence on international trade 
relations because of their scale increased by number of states participated in each bloc. 
Moreover, the formation of these agreements seems to continue, meaning that cooperation 
between regional trade blocs will be widespread. Hence, a focal objective of the presented 
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paper – is to determine reasons for the formation and proliferation of region-to-region trade 
agreements.  
Practically, a cause for investigating this theme was triggered by the signing of 
interregional trade agreements between the European Union and Mercosur and the European 
Union and Andean Community, by negotiations on new interregional trade agreements 
between the European Union and ASEAN, the Andean Community and Mercosur and others 
(Bajo 1999; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2003; Devlin, Estevadeordal and Krivonos 2000; Van der 
Geest 2004). Also, it is expected that there will be a promising continuation in developments 
of the block-to-block trade relationships. As seen above, the most active actor in the formation 
of interregional trade agreements is the European Union, hence, a focus of the paper is 
dedicated to examination of cooperation between the European Union and other regional trade 
blocs in order to derive general patterns of interregional collaboration.  
Consequently, these kinds of the agreements will substantially affect international relations, 
international organizations and global trade, because they embrace groups of states, which 
multiply effect of impact to a great extent. Therefore, interregional trade agreements deserve 
to be researched deeper by academia and to be taken into consideration by governments, as 
they are very important for domestic and international politics, economic growth and financial 
policy. Indeed, there is a need for distinct theory explaining reasons for establishing 
interregional trade arrangements, because present theories in Whalley (1998), Aggarwal and 
Fogarty (2003), Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2003, 2013) do 
not reveal causal mechanisms for cooperation on bloc-to-bloc level taking into account 
integration level of blocs.  
The thesis aims to find an answer for research question as of what can explain the 
proliferation of interregional trade agreement. Particularly, there is an attempt to demonstrate 
the answers for this inquiry based on following factors. Firstly, I focuses on information about 
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the type of trade blocs creating interregional trade agreements, as there are occurrences of 
cooperation between some groups, while in other cases not. Furthermore, secondly, there 
should be a comparison of trade agreements formed on regional and interregional level, in so 
doing, then it will be evident to see differences between them. Thirdly, possible profits and 
losses from establishing trade agreements are underlined as well, because trade blocs take into 
account them in negotiations. Moreover, fourthly, the role of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in these processes should be covered due to its heavy influence on regional trade 
groups. Generally, this thesis has an objective to present compelling arguments for the question 
relating to explanation of the proliferation of region-to-region trade agreements. 
Dozens of materials on this subject shows the importance of interregional trade agreements 
in international organizations and international relations literature. Some authors attempt to 
distinguish types and forms of interregionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2003) and to examine 
particular cases (Bajo 1999; Boyer and Schuschny 2010; Szegedy-Maszak 2009). However, 
their arguments and hypotheses are not generally applicable to bloc-to-bloc trade cooperation, 
because each author focuses on own case and identifies special explanations. Consequently, 
this explanation of one case does not fit for other cases. Another part of academics devotes 
research to preferential trade agreements and gives very plausible theories and hypotheses for 
their explanation of emergence (Baldwin and Jaimovich 2010; Mansfield and Milner 2012; 
Mansfield and Pevehouse 2013; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008) and on the effect of the World 
Trade Organization (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003; Rose 2004; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers 
2007). Apparently, this second group of works does not particularly consider interregional 
trade agreement as a distinct political phenomenon in international relations with own 
developed theory and hypotheses. Therefore, I argue that there is a need for clear theory on 
interregional trade agreements, because their nature is different from other types of agreements 
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in inherent features as depth of regional trade blocs. Ultimately, on the foundation of these 
differences I propose theory on bloc-to-bloc agreements. 
Almost all basic assumptions explaining interregional cooperation are supported by 
statistical testing and robustness check, except a weak effect of development level, which can 
be explained by inadequate measurement of the concept or by its real insignificance for the 
formation of interregional trade agreements. Moreover, robustness check of the integration 
level of blocs shows that coordination in economic affairs are significantly important, while a 
level of political integration is important to less extent. The quantitative evidence is 
complemented with a case study on cooperation between the European Union and the Andean 
Community. Inclusion of qualitative research helps to demonstrate the processes occurred by 
influence of general factors.  
There are important policy implications derived from the results of conducted research for 
policy-makers. First of all, they should care about increasing mutual trade with a potential 
counterpart. Secondly, it is essential to deepen a level of integration within a bloc, particularly 
in economic spheres. Thirdly, policy-makers should pay attention to own and counterpart’s 
dispute history in the framework of the World Trade Organization, because it clearly shows to 
what extent an actor complies with international established rules in trade. Fourthly, even a 
level of development is not high, there is a chance to cooperate with other bloc. Policy-makers 
and negotiators can use these tools to reach interregional agreement. 
General research revealing main causal mechanisms of interregional trade agreements is 
not conducted yet. This thesis exploits already defined some factors of regional cooperation 
theories for interregional cooperation, which means that it contributes empirical study for 
understanding of the new object. Nevertheless, there is both empirical and theoretical 
contribution to the field of knowledge in insertion of bloc’s depth and WTO dispute histories 
for explanation of bloc-to-bloc cooperation.  
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Hence, the thesis seeks to construct an applicable theory with hypotheses, which explain 
the spread of interregional trade agreements. Particularly, by applying Fearon’s bargaining 
theory and its parameters as discount rate and status quo this research purports to address 
following arguments: (1) examination of integration level, (2) a role of development level, (3) 
trade gains enriching benefits from trade, (4) market access enhancing opportunity to sell goods 
and services, (5) reducing volatility in global trade and (6) seeking independence from the 
World Trade Organization. I assume that each of these arguments causes states to strive for 
region-to-region trade agreements. Notably, it is worth mentioning that the most important 
difference of interregional cooperation from state-to-state model of cooperation are an 
integration level of blocs and influence of the WTO on them. On the basis of these pillars, I 
hope, this paper is able to present explanation for the proliferation of interregional trade 
agreements. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review is dedicated to an explanation of reasons for concluding trade 
agreements. Mainly, I distinguish two groups in the literature relating to the topic of the paper. 
First group of scholars concentrates attention on case studies of bloc-to-bloc trade agreements, 
while second group examines regional trade agreements without differentiating them. These 
works are taken into consideration, because they help to reveal the foundation of trade 
arrangements. As there are two categories in the literature, I have two objectives in reviewing 
them. Firstly, the cases of interregional cooperation in trade are presented to show our current 
understanding as well as the gap in this field. Secondly, it can be very useful to review 
uncovered knowledge on regional cooperation, because this type of cooperation gives some 
insights on the formation of trade agreements in general.   . 
The proliferation of interregional trade agreements has previously been examined 
through single case studies such as European Union-NAFTA, European Union-Mercosur, 
European Union-ASEAN, European Union-Andean Community and Mercosur-Andean 
Community (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2003; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2005; Bajo 1999; Devlin, 
Estevadeordal and Krivonos 2000; Faust 2003; Rüland 2001; Szegedy-Maszák 2009; Van der 
Geest 2004). For instance, Bajo (1999) presents trade liberalization between the European 
Union and Mercosur as a driving force for cooperation, while Faust (2003) argues that 
economic interests of domestic groups, ambitions of political actors and WTO stagnation 
influence partnership between the European Union and Mercosur. Aggarwal and Fogarty 
(2003) research the European Union’s relationship with other blocs by focusing on industrial 
interests, balance of power and even political and cultural identities converging them into 
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cooperation. Seemingly, these cases show separate parts of one picture, as market access, trade 
gains and effect of the WTO, however, they do not address them in a complex manner as an 
examining the large number of cases. As pointed out before, Faust (2003) says that domestic 
politics plays a decisive role in the development of the European Union and Mercosur 
cooperation, however this is not applicable for cooperation between the European Union and 
the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), where internal politics do not 
affect the process significantly. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2003) do not determine the effect of 
the WTO and dispute history in considering the cases of European Union’s cooperation with 
other blocs. Therefore, by conducting case studies it is difficult to determine the general factors 
affecting interregional cooperation and delineating the importance of variable over other one. 
Meanwhile, in the large number of data these requirements can be fulfilled. In turn, this means 
that it is possible to come up with a common theory presenting the main reasons for the creation 
of region-to-region trade agreements.  
In the development of a theory on interregional trade agreements, it is crucial to review 
the literature on regional trade agreements. The reason for this is a reduction of trade barriers 
grounded in the shared commonalities of the two arrangements, which is intrinsic to all 
preferential trade agreements. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2003, p. 6) note that interregionalism “is 
fundamentally cooperative in nature, intended to bring beneﬁts to both parties through 
voluntary negotiation and mutual agreement regarding a certain set of rights and 
responsibilities in cross-regional commerce”, consequently, this definition is entirely 
applicable to regionalism with a remark in a scale of cooperation.  
Literature on regional trade agreements is instructive in the development of this paper’s 
argument. Literature in this group can be divided into several parts revealing focal reasons in 
the establishment of these agreements. First, the role of bargaining power is emphasized in 
negotiations creating trade arrangements. Second category is dedicated to indicating the 
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importance of market access as a driving force, because, it leads to an increase of trade gains. 
Third, some researchers argue that a crucial function of regional trade agreements is reducing 
volatility in the global economy. Last group of people supposes regional trade agreements as a 
counterbalancing power opposed to the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
Generally, scholars adhere to one or several of abovementioned reasons in explaining the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements. Although, literature on regional trade agreements 
has many worthwhile explications, they are not explicitly devoted to interregional trade 
agreements. Despite the fact that regional and interregional trade agreements have shared 
commonalities, it is a crucial task to delineate region-to-region trade cooperation from other 
types, as a distinct consideration of them helps to clarify the blurred causal mechanisms and to 
propose a theory explaining the proliferation of interregional trade agreements. Precisely, a 
certain difference of inter-group cooperation is regional bloc’s own structure. Each bloc has 
quality of integration in fiscal, monetary, political coordination and supranational institutions, 
while these issues are not met in state level of cooperation, because they have uniform policy 
due to one main government, parliament and judicial system. This is defining condition for 
their actions in international arena (Hufbauer and Schott 1994; Efird and Genna 2002; Efird 
and Genna 2003; Feng and Genna 2003; Genna and Hiroi 2004; Feng and Genna 2005; Geda 
and Kebret 2007; Genna 2011).  
One of the reasons for the spread of regional trade agreements is bargaining power. 
Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) point out that obtaining the bargaining power is closely 
connected with multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO. On the one hand, in order to have 
more influence during the negotiations or, on the other hand, in order to avoid undesirable 
consequences in a case of halted negotiations in the WTO, countries are inclined to seek 
partnerships. This was supported by Faust’s (2002) case study on relationship between the 
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European Union and Mercosur, where the members of these trade blocs try to strengthen own 
bargaining leverages and to establish more tenable relations with main trade partners.  
Surprisingly, this intention to obtaining more bargaining leverage has a negative effect 
for initiators of regional cooperation. Haftel (2004) argues that members of regional trade blocs 
are objects for complaints by the means of WTO disputes from third countries. However, it 
does not mean that those third countries are in the winning position in the disputes. They will 
be more successful, if they have more bargaining power because of membership in their own 
regional trade blocs. This is seen from Mansfield’s article (2013), where South American 
countries in order to negotiate equally with NAFTA and the European Union were forced to 
create Mercosur. Also, Gallagher (2007) presents a case of resistance to the Doha Round, where 
developing countries, mainly countries from Mercosur, the Andean Community and ASEAN 
were not satisfied by the potential benefits. Obviously, the articles point out an importance of 
bargaining leverage in the negotiations and a framework of the WTO. These examples show 
that after obtaining necessary bargaining leverage the developing countries can considerably 
enhance their own influence in deciding various trade liberalization issues.  
The next trigger for concluding regional trade agreements is market access and trade 
gains. Whalley (1998), Mansfield and Milner (2012), Mansfield (2013), Mansfield and 
Pevehouse (2013) indicate that preferential trade agreements have a property to expand further, 
if there is open access to trade areas and fairly distributed gains. This means that seeking for a 
growth of trade induces states to negotiate for access to foreign markets on mutually beneficial 
terms. It is a general picture, however, as Mattli (1999) notes there is a role of domestic 
decision-makers, who should be able to comply with the undertaken commitments during 
integration process. In determining commitments of market access and trade gains, as Milner 
(1997) argues, certain types of industries, preferences of political leaders and mutual tariff 
reductions are bases for establishing regional trade blocs. In the same way, Baccini and Dur 
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(2012) focus on an importance of market access, they explain it by exporters, who provoke 
own governments to conclude preferential trade agreements because of competition in the 
international market. To be precise, trade arrangements consist of terms and conditions 
regulating trade barriers and tariffs on goods and services. In so doing, countries will have clear 
information on products realized in market of a particular country. 
It is also important to emphasize reducing volatility in the market as one of the driving 
factors leading to the emergence of regional trade blocs. Mansfield and Pevehouse’s (2000) 
reveal that preferential trade agreements diminish a possibility of conflict between members 
within the arrangement, while, in the same manner, Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008) argue that 
preferential trade agreements and the WTO decrease potential economic instabilities in the 
world by establishing certain stable rules for trade and by providing dispute settlement 
mechanisms in a case of disagreements between countries. Therefore, on the level of regional 
trade blocs this potential risk in causing trade volatility heavily harming the world economy is 
prevented by regional trade blocs. Moreover, Mansfield (2013) claims a positive contribution 
of regional trade agreements in stabilizing political situations in member countries and global 
market. Hence, the formation of regional trade agreement establishes more stable and profitable 
partnerships between states.  
Apart from abovementioned reasons, the “domino effect” has also been proposed as a 
reason for the proliferation of regional trade agreements (Baldwin and Jaimovich 2012). The 
“domino effect” means that third parties seek to conclude preferential trade agreements, 
because other two countries concluded their own trade agreements. Actors perceive this process 
as a normal order in international political economy. For example, after initial intentions to 
conclude the US-Latin America relationship in the form of Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
the European Union began to negotiate the EU-Mercosur trade agreement (Söderbaum, 
Stelgren and Van Langenhove 2005). The same pattern can be applied to NAFTA, ASEAN 
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and the Andean Community, which started to find out ways for establishing interregional trade 
arrangements (Ruland 2001; Szegedy-Maszak 2009).  
 To summarize this review, scholars have created great knowledge explaining the 
behavior of states and of regional trade blocs. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, each of these 
researches is a piece of whole picture, which means that none of authors present theory 
embracing all aspects of interregional trade agreements. To be precise, the case studies on 
interregional trade cooperation are devoted to particular instances, however, they have slightly 
limited foundation proposing a general applicable theory for these types of agreements. At the 
same time, literature on regional trade agreements has strong arguments, which can basically 
explain interregional cooperation due to the fact that cooperation is still in trade. However, they 
do not address problems of depth within a bloc that is more complicated level of institution. As 
a result, there are two shortcomings, which create a gap in understanding of region-to-region 
trade arrangements. Firstly, it is an absence of theory explaining interregional cooperation 
fully. Even if this can be reached by theories of regional trade agreement, they do not take into 
account depth of bloc’s integration, which is one of the decisive unique features in interregional 
cooperation. Second gap is a lack of empirical study on interregional trade blocs by considering 
depth of integration, mutual trade, a level of development, an effect of the WTO and dispute 
history in the WTO. The objective of this paper is to fill these gaps on the basis of existed 
studies and to supplement by novelties directly applicable to the proliferation of interregional 
trade agreements. In so doing, I strive to clearly show theory and hypotheses by shedding light 
on detailed causal mechanisms in the spread of region-to-region trade agreements. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY 
 
I construct explanation for proliferation of interregional trade agreements relying on 
bargaining theory proposed by Fearon (1998) and Mansfield and Reinhardt’s (2003) 
determinants of regional integration. The former proposes the theory revealing the main 
principles of cooperation in international relations, while the latter account for proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements. In so doing, Fearon’s tenets of cooperation are clearly reflected 
through Mansfield and Reinhardt’s reasons for expanding preferential trade agreements. At the 
beginning, I present essential ideas leading to interregional trade arrangement by following 
Fearon, and then I apply and expand causal mechanisms proposed by Mansfield and Reinhardt. 
Application of Fearon’s bargaining theory (1998) settles a basic foundation for building 
arguments accounting for interregional cooperation. He came up with a generalized foundation 
for understanding of collaboration logic. The bargaining theory consists of two stages: (1) 
bargaining phase and (2) enforcement phase. In the first stage, two actors bargain over a 
particular issue, while in the second stage, both parties care about compliance with established 
agreement. These two phases are very closely interconnected with each other. To show this 
link, in bargaining stage, each actor has own preference, meaning that they are different on a 
particular issue. Subsequently, they negotiate on the terms of cooperation by defending own 
positions, because they know that future agreement will demand to comply with and any 
detection can be punished. Therefore, actors negotiate harder in bargaining stage in order not 
to lose in enforcement stage. After the formation of agreement, terms finally agreed by both 
side are mutually beneficial in comparison with a status quo case, where two actors suffer more. 
In other words, a focal point in the bargaining theory is obtaining more gains from cooperation 
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than from non-cooperation. Fearon (1998) emphasizes that there are two costs for non-
cooperation and delaying cooperation due to the negotiations over terms and conditions: (1) 
discount rate of future cooperation and (2) opportunity costs. It is essential to understand them, 
because these two costs are parameters triggering actors to cooperate and how to cooperate in 
any type of agreement in the following way. First, discount rate or shadow of the future is a 
degree to which actors value future interaction after the formation of agreement, which, in turn, 
has influence on patience of actors during the negotiations. If future benefit is higher than 
current ones, then actor will patiently bargain over the object. This is closely connected with 
enforcement and monitoring of actor’s behaviors within the settled rules of arrangement, as it 
affects their future cooperation. To reiterate, the more the discount rate, the shorter the shadow 
of the future and the less actors value agreement. Otherwise, if discount rate decreases it means 
that shadow of the future will extends and an importance of cooperation for actors will grow 
up. Second, opportunity costs means that a state of affairs of non-cooperation is less beneficial 
than in a case of cooperation. During the lack of cooperation and negotiations actors lose time, 
when they can potentially benefit from already formed cooperation. In a case of interregional 
cooperation, blocs are actors engaged or not in cooperation. Those blocs are influenced by 
conceptual costs of discount rate and status quo, which are reflected by following variables: 
bilateral trade, depth of integration, level of development, stagnation of the WTO, and WTO 
dispute history. It is seen that two parameters conceptually drive trade bloc’s preferences to the 
formation of interregional trade arrangement. Thus, this paper attempts to apply the parameters 
of bargaining theoretical framework for explication of interregional trade agreements.  
 In addition, there is an argument underpinning reasons for the proliferation of 
interregional arguments, which is similar to the explanations for spread of regional trade 
agreements. In both level of cooperation, generally, the arguments rely on both parameters, 
discount rate costs and opportunity costs of bargaining theory. However, specifically what are 
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commonalities and differences in explanations between bloc-to-bloc and state-to-state formats? 
Why do we see proliferation of bloc-to-block cooperation instead for bloc-to-state cooperation?  
On the level of regional trade agreements, Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) propose 
subsequent reasons, bargaining leverage, market access, trade gains, reducing volatility and 
existence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which provoke states to cooperate in trade. 
Market access and trade gains give purely economic advantages for states, because they 
directly relate to economic growth. Volatility in global economy always affects economics and 
politics in either the domestic or international arena. Therefore, states attempt to reduce 
instability in international economy by concluding these regional trade agreements. Lastly, 
today the WTO is a huge framework in trade and trade-related issues in the world. Each country 
bloc is strongly bound to its framework and processes. However, some decisions or procedures 
can be harmful for interests of states, therefore, to be ready for unexpected events they want to 
have straight trade agreements with major partners. 
All abovementioned factors are relevant for interregional cooperation level. 
Nevertheless, the costs of these reasons are incredibly higher due to increased scale of involved 
actors. Firstly, shadow of the future, which is a patience of bloc for the formation of 
interregional cooperation needs more efforts to construct, because there are several states 
coordinating policies towards other bloc consisting of states with the same problems.  Thus, 
negotiation processes are more complicated on bloc-to-bloc level in comparison with state-to-
state level. Secondly, in region-to-state model one state has less voice in comparison with a 
group of states and this can lead to more concessions from one state in the front of demands 
from a group of states. Due to this fact, if a state does not have enough power, it will not form 
cooperation with a bloc. In state-to-state level, opportunity costs are lower for a state, because 
there are many states for cooperation. Meanwhile in case of region-to-region model, there are 
only 26 regional trade blocs actively engaged in international relations and losing one out of 
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these possible partners substantially decreases opportunity of enjoying an interregional 
cooperation. Therefore, in order not to suffer and obtain more future payoffs it is better for 
trade blocs to deal in group-to-group model. It is worth emphasizing that essential idea of 
bargaining theory is not to lose more hugely and protect itself as much as possible. In so doing, 
discount rates and opportunity costs induce trade blocs to form interregional trade agreements. 
 
Preferences of actors in interregional trade cooperation 
To begin with, it is essential to identify main players in bargaining theory in the bloc-
to-bloc cooperation case. They are regional trade blocs, who can negotiate, form and act within 
this agreement. Each regional trade bloc is considered as one player, however, as revealed by 
Hubauer and Schott (1994), they have different levels of integration. This score indicates a 
quality of depth in coordination of divergent policies within one trade bloc1. Hence, it is 
inherent feature of any regional trade bloc, which should be taken into account, as it influences 
a behavior of main players on international arena.   
Here it is worth mentioning the preferences of trade blocs and their connection with the 
parameters affecting to a creation of interregional trade agreements. I argue that regional trade 
blocs are interested in increasing of market size and trade gains, however if they not cooperate 
or delay cooperation between each other, they discount future benefits. This implies that they 
lose these benefits. Moreover, current status quo provokes bloc to cooperate with other one 
bilaterally, because there is a cumbersome organization as the WTO, which is at a standstill 
and there are frequent trade disputes and noncompliance with rules between states (Mansfield 
and Reinhardt 2003; Gallagher 2007). Intuitively, trade blocs with a bad history in WTO 
disputes are not attractive partners for other actors. In other words, the WTO cannot provide 
                                               
1 The integration achievement score is calculated by following elements: (1) free movement of goods and services, 
(2) free movement of capital, (3) free movement of labor, (4) supranational institutions, (5) monetary coordination 
and (6) fiscal coordination. Each of this element is measured from 0 to 5. 
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stable interactions between trade partners, therefore, in order to strengthen them, blocs seek to 
form a trade agreement regulating issues regarding their partnership by a direct route. Thus, 
cooperation makes both sides better off in comparison with status quo situation. 
 
Market access and trade gains 
Information on previous and current level of bilateral market access and trade are two 
intertwined causes in the proliferation of any trade agreements in the future, because they have 
a straight connection with opportunity costs. As two actors have had large market access and 
trade gains have increased in the present time, it means that there is a great potential to expand 
cooperation further. Hence, as future benefits grow up, opportunity costs increase implying 
that arrangement will be more likely. Whalley (1998) emphasizes trade gains and market access 
among factors leading to regional trade agreements, because they give mutual benefits. Also, 
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2013) argue that trade openness and a fair distribution of trade gains 
leads to expansion of preferential trade agreements. Although, originally proposed to 
understand regional agreements, one can use them to analyze interregional trade agreements 
for empirical testing with inclusion of theoretical argument on depth of integration. In a case 
of interregional trade agreements, the reason for their importance is evident, because the larger 
the market access, the more the trade gains. In other words, interregional cooperation offers 
more opportunities in comparison with state-to-state trade cooperation. Each developed and 
developing state wants to have markets, which give opportunities to sell goods and services.  
Furthermore, many articles dedicated to particular case studies on interregional trade 
agreements claim that market access and trade gains have a significant effect on their 
establishments. Bajo (1999), Aggarwal and Fogarty (2003) Devlin, Estevadeordal and 
Krivonos (2003) in cooperation between the European Union and Mercosur and Van deer Geest 
(2004) in cooperation between the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian 
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Nations (ASEAN) stresses that trade flows will increase if regional trade blocs conclude trade 
agreement. The observation was supported by a quantitative analysis of interregional trade 
agreements in Boyer and Schuschny’s (2010) article.   
As a result, it is shown that interregional agreement increases confidence of 
businessmen and investors, which raise profits from trade. Therefore, interregional trade 
agreements are useful way to guarantee market access and to attain trade gains.  
Hypothesis 1: interregional trade agreement is likely between trade blocs, if previous 
and current level of bilateral market access and trade has a potential to expand further.  
 
Depth  
 As well as opportunity costs, discount rate parameter plays a huge role in stimulating 
regional trade blocs to cooperation in interregional trade format. As mentioned above, main 
actors in forming interregional trade agreements are blocs consisting of several countries. Each 
bloc varies over terms and conditions under which they work. It means if one bloc has strict 
internal rules and each constituent obey them, then, a bloc has a high level of policy 
coordination. Policy affinity assists to act in international arena as a uniform body. This leads 
to assumption that a quality of integration within trade bloc itself is a very important factor for 
creation of interregional trade agreement, because more integrated bloc is constant in its policy 
(Hufbauer and Schott 1994; Efird and Genna 2002; Efird and Genna 2003; Feng and Genna 
2003; Genna and Hiroi 2004; Feng and Genna 2005; Geda and Kebret 2007; Genna 2011).  
The preferences of a bloc are evident and it acts more effectively in the negotiations, 
while less integrated bloc has a divergent policy and cannot be a reliable partner for more 
integrated trade bloc. Hence, in the negotiations depth reflects discount rate concept by 
presenting a patience for future cooperation, as more integrated bloc is more consistent in 
actions within a bloc. Meanwhile, more integrated trade bloc is more predictable and stable in 
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future cooperation, which, in turn, shows that it is profitable to form an interregional trade 
agreement with such group than with less integrated group. This means that opportunity costs 
are higher, if a bloc does not cooperate with other deeply integrated bloc than with less 
integrated one. In so doing, cooperation between more integrated regional trade blocs decreases 
discount rate and increase opportunity costs due to uniform policy and high level of 
coordination. Consequently actors are willing to develop partnership further and form bloc-to-
bloc trade agreement with highly integrated group of states. 
Hypothesis 2: higher integrated trade bloc is likely to form interregional trade 
agreement with other higher integrated trade bloc. 
 
Level of development 
 Regional trade blocs pay a huge attention to a level of development meaning that 
economic prosperity and consumer capability of blocs directly indicate future profits from trade 
agreement. This factor is linked to increasing opportunity costs parameter, because a high level 
of consumer capability increases amount of benefits in the future. Therefore, mutual inter-bloc 
cooperation between significantly developed actors seems to themselves very attractive. 
Meanwhile, a bloc with low level of consumer capability seems for other blocs as not 
profitable, because citizens cannot afford to buy their goods and services. There are arrays of 
interregional collaboration examples as the European Union-ASEAN, the European Union-
Mercosur, the European Union-Andean Community and Mercosur-Andean Community, where 
counterparts have higher level of development in comparison with other regional trade blocs 
(Bajo 1999; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2003; Aggarwal and Fogarty 2005; Devlin, Estevadeordal 
and Krivonos 2000; Faust 2003; Rüland 2001; Szegedy-Maszák 2009; Van der Geest 2004). 
 In addition, it is worth mentioning that the level of development demonstrates only 
potential trade gains from consumer capability of a particular bloc and it does not reflect a 
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current state of affairs between blocs. In this sense, emphasizing the difference between 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 is very crucial. Hypothesis 1 accounts for understanding past 
and present levels of partnership by analyzing their trade flows, however they do not address a 
potentiality of consumers. Hypothesis 3 directly shows a consumer capability of blocs, which 
gives insights about realization degree of products in the future. For instance, there can be the 
case, when two blocs have high level of development, however, they do not extensively trade 
with each other. This means that despite the fact that their consumers can buy expensive 
products, it is less likely that they will form trade agreement, because they do not have a high 
level of partnership in export and imports of goods and services in the past and present. This 
leads to assumption that the level of development shows a possible benefits from cooperation 
without accounting current state of affairs between blocs. 
Hypothesis 3: interregional trade agreement is likely between trade blocs consisting 
of more developed states. 
 
The WTO and disputes history in the WTO  
Opportunity costs parameter affects interregional cooperation by opting between 
current status of instability of global economy and disputes in the WTO and creation of stable 
ties with partners through interregional trade agreement. If regional trade organizations are 
satisfied with current state of affairs in international arena, they will not try to cooperate 
through bypassing existing system. However, it is not true, because trade blocs are forming 
trade agreements with each other due to suffering from existing rules and subsequent 
dissatisfaction with them. Hence, it is a pure influence of status quo parameter on cooperation 
in the form of interregional trade blocs. 
Particularly, volatility is unpredictability of the global economy caused by the actions 
of countries as trade barriers, imposing taxes, protectionism and other measures, which can 
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harm economies of other countries. In order to prevent these economic disasters and 
instabilities and make a behavior of actors more predictable, states are inclined to form 
arrangements, which regulate different issues in economics and finance (Mansfield and 
Pevehouse 2000; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008). Notably, interregional trade agreements are 
very influential in the world, because they consist of several states. Nowadays, each regional 
trade arrangement – the European Union, Mercosur, NAFTA, ASEAN and others – more or 
less has considerable effect on stability of the global economy. To tackle this uncertainty in 
volatility of global market, trade agreements help to make internal legislation more transparent 
and predictable by eliminating protectionism and other trade barriers (Baccini and Kim 2012). 
Therefore, a creation of these agreements is a vital point for whole system of the global 
economy. 
Last reason is closely bound with previous factor. The WTO is considered as one of the 
most inclusive organizations in the world, which facilitates trade flow and eliminates trade 
barriers. The WTO positively effects the formation of interregional cooperation but 
interestingly there are its two positive and one negative features. Firstly, participation in the 
WTO means meeting high requirements recognized by international community. Secondly, the 
WTO aims to exchange information between members. However, thirdly, it has a drawback as 
many members with different interests at the same time. Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) 
explicitly point out that the WTO can balk at some issues, which cannot be tackled 
unanimously. This was firmly confirmed by the Doha Round, when the United States of 
America, the European Union and developing countries had long discussions on agriculture 
(Gallagher 2007). In other words, when there is an absence of consent between members on a 
particular problem, the WTO needs time for finding a solution. Therefore, countries want to 
have a “backup” plan in a case of crisis caused by framework of the WTO. As an alternative 
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plan to the WTO, states see interregional trade agreements guaranteeing certainty in relations 
with most important trade partners. 
Hypothesis 4a: interregional trade agreement is likely between trade blocs consisting 
of states, which are members of the WTO. 
As discussed earlier, the WTO is a complex institution regulating trade issues over the 
globe and 161 states participate there. The organization has three general agreements regarding 
trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights, while there is a lot of additional specific 
agreements in agriculture, textile, government procurement and other fields. Legislation of the 
WTO practically covers all fields of trade activity and gives a possibility to solve disputes 
between states in the framework of this institution. Therefore, it is justified to exploit disputes 
history of the WTO, as there are many member-states and a lot of regulations on trade issues, 
which can be used as an indicator of compliance with terms of possible trade agreement. 
 Logically, those regional trade blocs comprising of states, which violate rules of the 
WTO and are frequently complained by other states, are not reliable partners. As Fearon (1998) 
claims in the enforcement stage, there is a repeated Prisoners Dilemma and each counterpart is 
monitoring other side. In this sense, already well known as a violator having a spoiled history 
of disputes is a reluctant partner in interregional trade agreement. Indeed, there is a significant 
uncertainty in compliance of notorious partner with the rules of agreement in the future. It is 
evident that actors are interested in predictable partnership, because it helps to establish more 
long term and reliable cooperation, which, in turn, positively increases benefits from trade. 
Intuitively, the opposite case brings high risks for business due to the unexpected consequences 
from unilateral actions, for instance, restricting trade flows in particular goods and services and 
rising up taxes and payments for exporting them, of violator country participating in a particular 
bloc. This uncertainty leads to decreasing opportunity costs, which make cooperation with 
untrustworthy state participating in regional trade bloc less likely. Therefore, trade blocs 
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comprising of states often violating the WTO rules are not reliable partners for the formation 
of interregional trade agreement. 
Hypothesis 4b: interregional trade agreement is not likely between regional trade 
blocs consisting of states, which are frequently engaged in trade disputes in the WTO. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Research on interregional trade agreement is a complex issue due to the structural form 
of main actor. Regional trade blocs comprise of three or more states, vary in internal integration 
level and act as one entity in the international arena. Therefore, the unit of analysis is bloc-
year. Generally, as non-economic factors represent categorical conceptions I take average 
number in them in one year. Also, if someone take the sum in non-economic variables an 
extraordinary member of bloc can distort real situation by own results, while taking the 
averages reflects a real picture more correctly. To the contrary, in economic indicators figures 
are foremost assessment tool and therefore sum of numbers in one year is more relevant.  
For the sake of investigating the logic of forming bloc-to-bloc trade agreement 
influenced by trade gains, market access, depth of integration within a trade bloc, volatility of 
the WTO and dispute history, I choose the relationship between the European Union and other 
trade blocs as a general pattern, because the former has the largest number of this trade 
agreement and is the most developed trade bloc nowadays. Furthermore, interestingly, the 
European Union negotiates and signs trade agreements with particular groups, while others are 
not considered as partners for cooperation. Hence, there is a question on what criteria are based 
European Union’s selectivity in counterparts. Taken into account that many trade blocs follow 
the European Union’s policy, ultimate findings would enrich us with some useful conclusions 
on behavior of regional trade in forming interregional trade agreements (Haas 1961; Dorrucci 
et al. 2004; Malamud and Schmitter 2007; Telò 2013). 
Although, someone can argue that focusing on the European Union and other blocs’ 
cooperation will lead to selection bias, there is an argument that many regional trade blocs 
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purport to emulate an integration pattern of the European Union (Haas 1961; Dorrucci et al. 
2004; Malamud and Schmitter 2007; Telò 2013). Particularly, justification for this is based on 
the fact that the European Union is a leader in interregional cooperation and other regional 
blocs are willing to seek for this model, therefore it is worth revealing common patterns from 
the European Union’s relationships with the rest of regional trade blocs. Consequently, as the 
European Union was formed in 1992 and generally interregional trade agreement emerged 
from that period, I decided to collect data from 1993 to 2012. The data is panel, because there 
are determinants changing over time and comparing different subjects. There are 26 regional 
trade blocs, which are formally registered in the Regional Trade Agreements database of the 
WTO.  
 
Dependent variable 
Dependent variable is the status of trade agreement between the European Union and 
26 regional trade blocs and denoted as IRTAwithEU. According to the status of cooperation, it 
is divided into two groups, 0 in a case of non-negotiations and of non-agreement and 1 in a 
case of ongoing negotiations over agreement and of already formed agreement. The data on 
status of interregional trade agreements between the European Union and other blocs is 
obtained from official web sites of the European Union and other trade blocs.  
Specifically, as the dependent variable is dichotomous, I decide to use a logistic 
regression model. The regression is ran with (1) lagged independent variables, (2) clustering 
standard errors based on regional trade agreements and (3) using cubic splines for dealing with 
time-dependency (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Firstly, as I have panel data meaning that 
variables change over time, it is relevant to lag all explanatory variables. This complication 
calculates past effect of independent variables on current dependent variable. Secondly, 
clustering assumes that each regional trade bloc is different from each other, consequently this 
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implies that each bloc possesses unique indicators in the variables. Therefore clustering helps 
to take into account these differences from institution to institution. Thirdly, logistic regression 
supposes that each observation is independent across subjects and years. To cope with 
dependency arising from the panel nature of the data, I include cubic splines. They consider 
each year as distinct and independent from other years, which afterwards gives a possibility to 
deal with time-dependency (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). 
 
Independent variables 
There are several independent variables as market access, trade gains, depth, a level of 
development, WTO membership and WTO disputes, which, I assume, affect the formation of 
interregional trade agreement. Each variable has own specific characteristics and is collected 
from reliable sources. 
As market access and trade gains aimed to present previous and current level of trade 
between actors, there is a need to take into account import and export flows between them. 
Theoretically, total trade flows reflect both discount rate and opportunity costs, because if a 
trade flow between blocs is high in the past and present, then they are patient as it has a potential 
to extend to higher level. Values on import and export are simply sums of member-states’ 
indicators within one regional trade bloc. Then, I take the sum in these values on import and 
export for deriving a total amount of trade, TotalTrade, between the European Union and other 
counterpart. This measurement of total trade is widely used in Mansfield and Pevehouse 
(2000), Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) and Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2008).  
Consequently, I take the logarithm of TotalTrade to TotTradeLogged in order to make it more 
normal and decrease the scale. Hence, obtained figures reflect a state of affairs in the past and 
present time in overall trade. The data is collected from the International Monetary Fund’s 
database called the Direction of Trade Statistics (2015).  
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Depth of trade blocs is measured by the Integration Achievement Score (IAS), which is 
widely used in the literature (Hufbauer and Schott 1994; Efird and Genna 2002; Efird and 
Genna 2003; Feng and Genna 2003; Genna and Hiroi 2004; Feng and Genna 2005; Geda and 
Kebret 2007; Genna 2011). In turn, this means that IAS measures conceptual discount rates and 
status quo costs. Higher integration score is equal to less discount rate and more opportunity 
costs for regional blocs. Also, the integration score is calculated according to following 
measures (1) free movement of goods and services, (2) free movement of capital, (3) free 
movement of labor, (4) supranational institutions, (5) monetary coordination and (6) fiscal 
coordination. The IAS varies from 0 to 5 and reflects a quality of integration in abovementioned 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
IRTAwithEU 479 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Rtaid 479 14.51 8.373 1 26 
Year 479 2,003 5.712 1,993 2,012 
Import 479 5.221e+10 8.408e+10 3.481e+08 5.331e+11 
Export 479 4.601e+10 7.231e+10 6.673e+07 4.532e+11 
TotalTrade 479 9.822e+10 1.514e+11 4.217e+08 8.291e+11 
ImportLogged 479 23.56 1.645 19.67 27.00 
ExportLogged 479 23.40 1.837 18.02 26.84 
TotTradeLogged 479 24.20 1.689 19.86 27.44 
IAS 473 1.098 0.681 0.167 2.833 
EIAS 471 1.226 1.036 0 3.667 
PIAS 479 0.916 0.625 0 3 
GDPpcMean 479 5,384 7,282 268 42,700 
GDPpcConstMean 479 5,353 7,084 322 30,299 
Membership 479 0.689 0.355 0 1 
ComplainantinWTO 479 0.170 0.578 0 7 
RespondentinWTO 479 0.153 0.506 0 5 
DisputesinWTO 479 0.324 1.018 0 9.997 
PolityDummy 479 0.328 0.470 0 1 
EUpolityDummy 479 1 0 1 1 
IASofEU 479 3.674 0.215 3.333 3.833 
Distance 479 7,731 3,500 1,548 15,778 
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fields. In so doing, the components of the IAS score are comprehensive, because they capture 
main spheres of integration in regional institutions. 
The Gross Domestic Product per capita, GDPpcMean, taken from the World Bank 
(2016a) expresses the level of development within a bloc, because it precisely shows a 
consumer capability of citizens. Theoretically, GDPpcMean reflects status quo costs affecting 
the interregional cooperation. Particularly, as GDPpcMean increases, costs of status quo rises 
as well. In other words, the consumer capability gives insights to what extent cooperation 
between blocs are beneficial. Despite the fact that GDP per capita is economic determinant, it 
is more logically justified to consider averaged level of development within a bloc, because it 
reflects overall picture of prosperity a group of states participating in regional integration. 
Therefore I calculate average of GDP per capita of regional trade blocs based on each member-
state’s GDP per capita.  
Detailed information on WTO membership (2015a) and WTO disputes (2015b) is 
obtained from a database of the WTO. WTO membership, Membership, is calculated in the 
following way: as a trade bloc is comprised of several states, firstly I determine a participation 
of country from a particular trade bloc in the WTO. 1 if a country is a member of the WTO and 
0 if a country is not member. Secondly, as it is non-economic variable I derive average 
membership number of regional trade bloc. Membership in the WTO affects states to 
cooperate, because they want to trade without pauses as it usually happens in this organization. 
Hence, conceptually, the variable is connected to opportunity costs, which claims that actors 
lose potential benefits from cooperation during the non-cooperation period.  
Technically, procedure for WTO disputes is similar, firstly, I identify participation in 
trade disputes as a complainant, ComplainantinWTO, and a respondent, RespondentinWTO, of 
one country from a particular group. Then, I calculate average trade disputes number of one 
bloc. Number of complainants varies from 0 to 7, while number of respondents varies from 0 
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to 5. Also, these records contain dispute history 1993-1994 in the framework of the GATT, 
because it was an ancestor of the WTO created in 1995. Dispute history gives information on 
a possible behavior of counterpart based on the past experience. If a counterpart frequently 
complained or violated the rules of the WTO, it means that it can repeat these actions. 
Conceptually, opportunity costs are low in this case, because a danger of being engaged in 
dispute considerably increases.   
 
Control variables 
The first control variable is a regime type, which is measured by PolityDummy obtained 
from the Polity IV Project and transformed to dichotomous variable (Marshall and Jaggers 
2002). Hence, PolityDummy is structured as 1 is democracy and 0 is authority. As previously 
mentioned in the cases of non-economic variables, I calculate average regime type scores of 
groups based on a polity score of each state. In addition, there is a polity score of the European 
Union, EUpolityDummy, which has no variation, because all members are democratic states. 
Therefore, I do not include EUpolityDummy in the model, as the statistical software omits it 
due to the absence of variance.  
In the same vein, EU’s integration quality, (Hufbauer and Schott 1994; Efird and Genna 
2002; Efird and Genna 2003; Feng and Genna 2003; Genna and Hiroi 2004; Feng and Genna 
2005; Geda and Kebret 2007; Genna 2011) IASofEU, should be taken under control, because 
other players see a uniformity of regional policy in the European Union and seek to cooperate. 
In other words, it seems that a deep level of integration within the European Union affects a 
potential counterpart to be more inclined for collaboration, because the former has already a 
high quality of coordination during negotiation process and after the formation of agreement 
in transporting of goods and services, working of regional institutions, monetary and fiscal 
policies.   
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Lastly, another control variable is distances, Distance, between Brussels and other 
capitals of states consisting regional trade blocs, because there is a possibility that near trade 
blocs are more inclined to form agreements than remote ones. The way of calculation is similar 
to previous non-economic variables. I collect data on a distance of capitals, then will derive 
average figures. The data will be obtained from the GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago 
2011).  
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
 
After running logistic regression based on the obtained data, generally, there are results 
supporting my arguments. Table 2 presents the estimates of independent variables on 
interregional trade agreement between the European Union and other trade bloc. Along with 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Logit coefficient (Model 1) 
  
L.TotTradeLogged 1.440*** 
 (0.517) 
L.IAS 2.528*** 
 (0.627) 
L.GDPpcMean 0.000192** 
 (9.13e-05) 
L.Membership 9.505*** 
 (1.988) 
L.RespondentinWTO -5.970*** 
 (0.867) 
L.ComplainantinWTO -1.490*** 
 (0.543) 
L.PolityDummy 0.880 
 (1.226) 
L.IASofEU 30.72*** 
 (8.374) 
L.Distance 0.000266 
 (0.000207) 
Agreeyrs -2.900*** 
 (1.029) 
_spline1 0.0246 
 (0.0182) 
_spline2 -0.0507** 
 (0.0223) 
_spline3 0.0364** 
 (0.0170) 
Constant -142.9*** 
 (26.44) 
  
Observations   477 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2. The Estimates of Interregional Trade Agreements 
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deriving coefficients of the variables, I present an example from real international arena, where 
a typical case shows substantive effects, including confidence intervals and uncertainty level 
based on the averaged estimates of the main model. Confidence interval is a range of predicted 
probability of cooperation affected by explanatory variable, while uncertainty level is an extent 
to which we are not sure in the range. This implies that the estimates show features cooperation 
between the European Union and an average regional trade bloc. Therefore, there is a 
possibility to understand theoretical arguments reflected by empirical case.  
 First, according to Table 2, the result of total trade flow between the European Union 
and other trade bloc are evident, it positively and significantly affects interregional cooperation. 
As TotTradeLogged flow aimed to capture Hypothesis 1, where previous and current level of 
trade gains and market access are factors triggering for further cooperation, it is seen that the 
European Union and other regional trade blocs are motivated by increasing benefits from trade 
through opening own markets broader. Hence, based on the estimates of total trade empirical 
result supports Hypothesis 1. 
As seen from Figure 1, total trade based on the sum of import and export flows shows 
gradual increasing in probability of interregional cooperation. As the total trade raises up, 
probability grows up. However, along with a growth of probability, uncertainty in the 
formation of interregional cooperation increase as well. For instance, when there is a total trade 
costing 80 billion dollars, the average predicted probability ranges from 0.02 to 0.21. 
Consequently, this means that uncertainty of predicted probability is about 0.19. Meanwhile, a 
predicted probability of cooperation based on total trade with 150 billion dollars starts from 
0.03 to 0.55 approximately. In this case, uncertainty increases to about 0.52. If there is a total 
trade costing 300 billion dollars between the European Union and averaged trade bloc, then a 
predicted probability varies between 0.05-0.85 with 0.80 uncertainty. This trend shows that 
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there is more confidence in an increase of probability on interregional cooperation increases as 
total trade increases but along with expanding uncertainty level. 
Second, an estimate of IAS score supports the role for depth of integration in Hypothesis 
2. The European Union is more likely to negotiate and form agreement with more integrated 
trade bloc. This is evidence for claiming that uniform policy and high level of coordination are 
very important factors in choosing partners for cooperation, because these features show to 
what degree a partner is reliable and predictable during the negotiations and enforcement stages 
and after establishment of arrangement in trade flows of goods and services between member 
states. 
Figure 2 presents confidence intervals of Integration Achievement Score aimed to show 
depth of integration. At 0 score there is 0 probability for cooperation, which can be said with 
0.01 uncertainty. If there is a trade bloc with 1 IAS score, then a probability negligibly 
Figure 1. Substantive Effects of Total Trade Flows in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
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increases. At 2 score cooperation can be vary between 0.05-0.45 meaning that there is almost 
0.40 uncertainty in a probability of cooperation between the European Union and other 
averaged trade group. However, there is a predicted probability ranging from 0.15 to 0.95 at 3 
IAS score, while uncertainty fluctuates for 0.80 approximately. Therefore, the typical case 
based on indicator of depth level shows a trend on increasing of probability in negotiations and 
agreement on interregional trade as well as growth of uncertainty in them. 
Third, as claimed in Hypothesis 3, a level of development is one of the essential 
qualities for establishing inter-bloc arrangement, as it gives insights on consumer capability for 
potential partners. The level of development is measured by the Gross Domestic Product per 
capita, GDPpcMean, which has a high significance at 0.95. Therefore, it can be stated that a 
high development level increases a probability of the interregional trade agreement with the 
European Union.  
Figure 2. Substantive Effects of IAS Score in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
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Figure 3 shows confidence intervals of GDP per capita, which is directed to show a 
level of development. Particularly, as GDP per capita rises up, probability of cooperation 
between the EU and the averaged trade bloc increases simultaneously. Nevertheless, along with 
them, uncertainty level also markedly goes up. For example, a trade bloc with 6000$ GDP per 
capita shows probability of cooperation varying only between 0.03-0.06, meaning that there is 
0.03 uncertainty. A trade bloc with 12000$ GDP per capita has 0.05-0.14 probability with 0.09 
uncertainty. At the same time, at 18000$ GDP per capita confidence intervals varies between 
0.06-0.48. In so doing, I observe 0.42 uncertainty in this range of predicted probability. It is 
evident that uncertainty enhances, as GDP per capita goes up. In terms of the argument, this 
trend is consistent, because a trade bloc with more GDP per capita is more inclined to create 
interregional trade agreement. 
Figure 3. Substantive Effects of GDP Per Capita in Current Dollars in EU-Averaged Bloc 
Cooperation 
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Fourth, membership in the WTO carries several signals for blocs. One the one hand, as 
a state participates in the WTO, it should meet international recognized standards. On the other 
hand, the WTO is an international institution, which shares information about other actors. All 
these two factors are positive features of the WTO influencing blocs to understand who is 
preferable for cooperation. Nevertheless, there is a negative feature of the WTO, which is its 
complex structure due to number of members impeding the quick and efficient decisions 
solving the problems. This negative peculiarity triggers blocs to establish bilateral interregional 
trade agreements instead of relying only on the WTO rules. Advantages and disadvantages of 
Membership in the WTO have a positive effect on cooperation between the EU and partner 
trade bloc. Therefore, in comparison with status quo, where the heavy WTO exists, it is more 
profitable to cooperate with important partners directly, where parties can manage their 
problems locally and quickly. Thus, opportunity costs lead trade blocs, including in this case 
the EU and other trade blocs, to seek for cooperation bilaterally.  
Figure 4. Substantive Effects of WTO Membership in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
36 
 
 
 
  As seen from Figure 4, there are confidence intervals of WTO membership. If no one 
in a regional trade group is a member of the WTO, then a probability of cooperation is equal 0 
in the bottom. Obviously, uncertainty level is very low 0.01 approximately. If each state 
consisting trade bloc participates in the WTO, then confidence intervals increase from 0.05 to 
0.6. Therefore, there is confidence in uncertainty of aforementioned predicted probability for 
0.60. In this typical case based on Membership figures of the averaged trade bloc, it is seen that 
a probability of cooperation is very low. Nevertheless, a general trend is in compliance with 
the results of Model 1.  
Last, the estimates of WTO respondents and complainants are negative and significant. 
Precisely, participation in the GATT/WTO disputes as a respondent, RespondentinWTO and as 
a complainant, ComplainantinWTO, decreases a probability of cooperation on bloc-to-bloc 
level. Thus, it is relevant noting that Hypothesis 4b is fully supported by respondent and 
participant records in the GATT/WTO dispute history. Bloc consisting of states with a dirty 
dispute history is undesirable partner for the European Union for the formation of interregional 
trade agreements. 
 Substantive effects of participation being as a respondent in the WTO is shown through 
binary variable. 0 is equal to absence of participations in disputes as respondent, while 1 is 
equal to 1 and more participations. Using the dichotomous measurement more clearly shows 
predicted probabilities of cooperation than count variable. Figure 5 demonstrates that in the 
typical case of means participation in WTO disputes as a respondent has relatively a low level 
of uncertainty. If there are 0 cases as a respondent, then a probability of cooperation is around 
0.02-0.13 only and uncertainty is 0.11. Meanwhile if there are any instance of participations in 
the WTO disputes, then there is almost 0-0.03 predicted probability in impossibility of 
cooperation between the EU and the averaged trade bloc. Generally, a general pattern of 
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participation in WTO disputes as a respondent is negative on cooperation as postulated in the 
hypothesis above.  
Confidence intervals of participation in WTO disputes as complainants are presented 
by Figure 6. Visibly, the graph demonstrates a congruent trend with Model 1. In other words, 
as a number of being complainants in the framework of the WTO increases, a predicted 
probability of cooperation decreases as well. In other words, any case of participation in a 
dispute considerably shortens likelihood of interregional cooperation. For example, a trade bloc 
with null cases of being complainants has 0.01-0.05 probability with only 0.04 uncertainty, 
while a trade bloc with 2 cases of being complainants has 0-0.01 probability with almost 0.01 
uncertainty. Meantime, 7 cases of complains in the WTO falls predicted probability to almost 
0. Subsequently, there is almost no uncertainty in a negative effect of complains in WTO 
disputes on interregional collaboration. In comparison with responding blocs complaining 
blocs have barely more chances for the formation of the arrangement. This tendency is logically 
Figure 5. Substantive Effects of WTO Respondents in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
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consistent finding, because it shows that a frequent complainant is more welcomed than a 
frequent respondent as a potential partner in the interregional agreement.  
Regarding control variables, they are different in their degree of influence on the 
formation of interregional cooperation. Despite the fact that PolityDummy has a positive effect, 
it does not significantly affect the European Union and other regional blocs to form agreements 
between each other. I suppose that polity types are not considered as an insurmountable barrier 
for trading on interregional level of collaboration, because blocs have not feature of regime as 
in case of state-to-state cooperation. 
A long history of political and economic dialogue from the World War II across the 
Europe and deep integration between member states of the European Union means for potential 
partners that the former coordinates free movement of trade and services, monetary and fiscal 
policies on very high level. This, in turn, is a promising signal of beneficial cooperation for 
Figure 6. Substantive Effects of WTO Complainants in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
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other regional institutions. Therefore, IASofEU has positive and significant estimates in the 
model.  
Lastly, Distance shows that a range of kilometers does not significantly affect 
cooperation between the European Union and other blocs. This finding can be explained by the 
fact that on group-to-group level of agreements actors do not take into account distances 
between them. If there are a potential trade gains and absence of formal barriers for trade, then, 
despite the remote locations, blocs will negotiate and form agreements. Also, probably long 
distances are not problem in the modern world, because there are many cheap possibilities to 
transport goods across continents and oceans.  
 This section of the paper is structured to show an effect of each explanatory variable on 
interregional cooperation. Bilateral total trade, depth of integration, WTO membership, WTO 
respondents, WTO complainants and a level of development measured by GDP per capita show 
trends consistent with the theory. I suppose that taking means of the variables, which is similar 
to indicators of the averaged trade bloc, demonstrates average picture of bloc-to-bloc 
collaboration influenced by the independent factors. Therefore, there is a need to present more 
comprehensive picture by using indicators of different regional blocs. For the sake of collecting 
full mosaic, I include investigations of two typical cases in the Appendices.  
  
40 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
  
The estimates of Model 1 needs robustness check in order to be confident in obtained 
results. Notably, almost all explanatory variables have several alternative measures, while only 
Membership is unique and cannot be relevantly substituted by other alternative variables. 
Substitutable variables are TotTradeLogged, IAS, RespondentinWTO, ComplainantinWTO and 
GDPpcMean, because each can be adequately tested with alternates. 
 There are Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 with different specifications, which generally 
support original Model 1. Meanwhile, I do not change specifications on lagging, clustering 
based on regional trade agreements and including cubic splines. These specifications are the 
same for Model 1 as well as for other three models. In order to see robustness of the arguments 
I analyze each model and compare their estimates with the estimates of Model 1. 
 Firstly, I substitute TotTradeLogged with ExportLogged, export flows between the 
European Union and regional blocs, in Model 2. Export is a component of total trade, therefore 
it can be considered as an additional indicator of trade level. Significance of exports flows is 
high at 95% level, which means that it has robustness. Figure 7 shows a predicted probability 
of interregional cooperation conditioned on export flows between particular trade blocs. It is 
seen that probability increases along with a growth of exports, although uncertainty level also 
goes up. For instance, if there is 30 billion dollars export flows, then cooperation will likely 
occur for 0.15 approximately with 0.13 uncertainty level. If there is 60 billion dollars export 
flows, a probability increases substantially to 0.40 with 0.38 uncertainty. This trend is 
continuous and seems that a high level export flows between trade blocs definitely magnifies 
chances for cooperation. IAS score can be divided into economic IAS, EIAS, consisting of a 
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free movement of goods and services, of a capital and of a labor and political IAS, PIAS, 
consisting of supranational institutions, monetary and fiscal coordination. Here in Model 2 I 
include EIAS, which significantly and positively affects in interregional cooperation. 
GDPpcMean is changed to GDPpcConstMean, which is the Gross Domestic Product in 
constant dollars in 2005. The reason for this substation is laid in possibility that the GDP 
gradually rises everywhere over time. For the sake of taking into account this trend and see 
what can be happened in case of stable dollar I include GDPpcConstMean. Its significance 
substantially decreased, while the effect is positive. This means that the influence of 
development on cooperation of blocs is weak in comparison with other explanatory variables. 
Membership in the WTO is significant and positive despite the made changes in Model 2. In 
order to check robustness of RespondentinWTO and ComplainantinWTO I create 
DisputesinWTO by summing numbers of participations as a respondent and a complainant. The 
significance level is at 0.99, so undoubtedly it confirms that frequent disputes history 
negatively affects a probability of cooperation between blocs.  
Figure 7. Substantive Effects of Export Flows in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
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Table 3. Robustness Check of Model 1 with Three Different Models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
L.TotTradeLogged 1.440***    
 (0.517)    
L.ExportLogged  1.824***   
  (0.347)   
L.ImportLogged   0.343 1.545*** 
   (0.413) (0.254) 
L.IAS 2.528***    
 (0.627)    
L.EIAS  2.466***  2.724*** 
  (0.482)  (0.599) 
L.PIAS   0.361  
   (0.646)  
L.GDPpcMean 0.000192**   -3.85e-05 
 (9.13e-05)   (5.53e-05) 
L.GDPpcConstMean  2.78e-05 0.000304***  
  (9.82e-05) (8.61e-05)  
L.Membership 9.505*** 11.65*** 9.609*** 8.549*** 
 (1.988) (1.902) (1.164) (2.437) 
L.RespondentinWTO -5.970***  -6.298***  
 (0.867)  (1.090)  
L.ComplainantinWTO -1.490***   -3.296*** 
 (0.543)   (0.720) 
L.DisputesinWTO  -3.320***   
  (0.443)   
L.PolityDummy 0.880 1.571 0.768 0.272 
 (1.226) (1.335) (1.104) (1.261) 
L.IASofEU 30.72*** 32.70*** 30.81*** 29.87*** 
 (8.374) (6.764) (6.402) (9.451) 
L.Distance 0.000266 -8.63e-05 0.000312** -0.000103 
 (0.000207) (0.000249) (0.000151) (0.000219) 
Agreeyrs -2.900*** -3.695** -2.813*** -2.835* 
 (1.029) (1.447) (0.576) (1.700) 
_spline1 0.0246 0.00936 0.0293** 0.0337 
 (0.0182) (0.0255) (0.0138) (0.0295) 
_spline2 -0.0507** -0.0393** -0.0570*** -0.0603*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0198) 
_spline3 0.0364** 0.0292*** 0.0395*** 0.0388*** 
 (0.0170) (0.00915) (0.0117) (0.00901) 
Constant -142.9*** -154.6*** -115.5*** -138.0*** 
 (26.44) (21.06) (24.79) (27.41) 
     
Observations 477 447 453 447 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Control variables in Model 2 do not change from their estimates in Model 1. 
PolityDummy and Distance are insignificant for the formation of interregional trade 
agreements. In other words, an influence of regime type and locations of actors do not 
encourage blocs to cooperate. Meantime, IASofEU presents robustness and has significance at 
0.99 level. This implies that a quality of integration within the European Union has a strong 
effect in Model 2. 
 Secondly, Model 3 is structured with ImportLogged instead of TotTradeLogged for 
testing arguments on potential trade gains and expanding market access, because along with 
export, import is constituent of total trade flows. ImportLogged is positive but insignificant in 
Model 1, which contradicts aforementioned assumption. This decreasing effect is conditioned 
on inclusion of PIAS demonstrating an insignificance level as well. PIAS score represents only 
political depth of cooperation within a trade bloc, which means that political dimension does 
Figure 8. Substantive Effects of WTO Membership in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation 
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not have significant effect. Generally, it seems to me that a political component of bloc is not 
focal point for cooperation in trade, because in the same vein, PolityDummy does not have 
significance in any model. Meanwhile, an influence of development measured by 
GDPpcConstMean strengthens in its estimates to p<0.05 in Model 3. This coefficient echoes 
with GDPpcMean in Model 1, however it is not enough to claim that a level of development 
certainly affects interregional cooperation in supportive way. Membership in the WTO 
significantly and positively affects groups of states as in previous models. Figure 7 clearly 
demonstrates in case of null membership in the WTO, it is certain that there is no possibility 
for interregional cooperation. Meanwhile, if a trade bloc as a whole is a member of the WTO, 
then predicted probability ranges from 0.20 to 0.70 approximately with 0.50 uncertainty level. 
This trend in Model 3 is very similar to Model 1’s one. For the sake of various specified models, 
I run regression with RespondentinWTO in Model 3 to see robustness of Model 1 with 
RespondentinWTO and ComplainantinWTO and of Model 2 with DisputesinWTO. The 
estimate of RespondentinWTO is significantly negative meaning that number of participations 
in the disputes of the WTO as a respondent diminishes a possibility of arrangement formation.  
 Control variables in Model 3 do not deviate from Model 1 and Model 2. On the one 
hand, PolityDummy and Distance are positive, however they do not have enough significance. 
It is a supportive evidence for statement that a type of polity and special positions of actors are 
deprived of importance. On the other hand, IASofEU shows very high significance level in 
Model 3. Potential blocs seek for cooperation with deeply integrated bloc, in this case with the 
European Union. 
 Thirdly, Model 4 comprises of ImportLogged to test Hypothesis 1, where trade flows 
triggers blocs to collaborate. I include ImportLogged in Model 4, because it is beneficial to see 
an effect of ImportLogged with EIAS and compare its insignificance in Model 3 with PIAS. 
Import flows’ estimate is significantly positive, which means that trade blocs are inclined to 
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form agreement, if they already have good level of bilateral trade. EIAS is robust in its positivity 
and significance in Model 4, which means that an economic depth of integration with a trade 
bloc is a crucial point for interregional cooperation. Figure 9 presents a predicted probability 
of interregional cooperation affected by EIAS score. If a trade bloc has 1 score, then 
collaboration with EU has 0.01-0.07 chance to occur, while a trade bloc with 2 score of 
economic integration has 0.07-0.35 probability of cooperation with the EU. At 3 score 
interregional cooperation is possible from 0.25 to 0.90 approximately with 0.65 uncertainty. 
To test a level of development I include GDPpcMean in Model 4 as in main Model 1, because 
an influence of development seems to be ambiguous because of results in Model 2 and Model 
3, when it was measured by GDPpcConstMean. Strikingly, an estimate of GDPpcMean 
becomes even worse and loses its significance in Model 4. This demonstrates that a level of 
development is unconvincing factor for the European Union to form trade agreements with 
other trade blocs. Membership is positive and significant, therefore it does not lose its influence 
Figure 9. Substantive Effects of EIAS Score in EU-Averaged Bloc Cooperation  
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in Model 4 as well as previous models. ComplainantinWTO is negatively and significantly 
affect cooperation, which confirms preceding results of models.  
 PolityDummy and Distance in Model 4 are not different from Model 1, which means 
that they have no significance. Meanwhile IASofEU proves its positive significance for 
interregional cooperation. In so doing, other blocs are under influence of high integration of 
EU member states.  
 This part of the paper is aimed to test robustness of the Model 1. It is made in a way, 
where I analyze and compare Model 1 with other models with different specifications. The 
main results support my hypotheses, however influence of some explanatory factors can be 
doubtful. Particularly, all independent variables in Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 are 
congruent with Model 1, except GDPpcMean created to test the effect of development level. 
GDPpcMean is weaker in Model 2 and 4 in comparison with Model 1, while in Model 3 it is 
significant under effect of PIAS. The influence of PIAS and EIAS is also very interesting 
finding, because it shows that a political integration of regional bloc does not have significant 
effect, while an economic integration of regional bloc substantially affects interregional 
cooperation.  
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CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDY: THE EUROPEAN UNION-ANDEAN COMMUNITY 
  
This case study aims to apply the theory and hypotheses for explanation of interregional 
cooperation between the European Union and the Andean Community. In so doing, I test 
explanatory power of the arguments based on the real instance. Initially, I introduce the EU-
Andean Community with a brief history of their relationship. Then, firstly, I use Hypothesis 1 
stating importance of bilateral trade for the formation of interregional trade agreement. 
Secondly, depth of integration within each party is revealed, then I uncover how this affected 
cooperation each other. Thirdly, a level of their development is studied according to Hypothesis 
3. This promises to be very intriguing, because an effect of development on bloc-to-bloc 
collaboration is ambivalent and not robust as shown above in the statistical analysis. Fourthly, 
I exploit the last hypotheses to account for an influence of the WTO membership and of the 
WTO disputes in the cooperation of the European Union and the Andean Community. Lastly, 
I derive some inferences from research of this case study. 
 
Brief history 
 A history of relationship between the European Union and the Andean community 
began in early 1990s, which I define as the first period of collaboration. In 1993 they signed a 
Framework Cooperation Agreement, which was not entered into force till 1998. This 
agreement was supposed to create road map for further cooperation, however, actions were 
slow and ineffective. Then, in 1996 the European Commission and the Andean Community 
signed the Declaration of Rome regulating political, trade, drug-trafficking and migration 
policies (Szegedy-Maszák 2009; European Union External Action Service 2016; Organization 
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of American States Foreign Trade Information System 2016). The Declaration of Rome 
stipulated general terms and showed initial intentions, however there was still crude provisions 
for comprehensive cooperation in solely trade. In this period, it is worth mentioning that I 
observe original attempt to build bloc-to-bloc cooperation, which perspectives increased in the 
following periods. 
 The second period started in the new millennium. Particularly, the European Union and 
the Andean Community agreed on terms of new agreement, called the Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement in 2003. This agreement contains provisions on deeper and more 
nuanced cooperation than the Declaration of Rome. Notably, the most important clause in the 
Agreement was to start negotiations on an Association Agreement and Free Trade Agreement 
as a part of it (Szegedy-Maszák 2009; European Union External Action Service 2016; 
Organization of American States Foreign Trade Information System 2016). Thus, both sides 
are congruent in extending partnership on higher level.  
 The last period of time is connected with negotiations process and a conclusion of the 
agreement as an apogee of cooperation. Shortly, from a representation of intentions to 
cooperate in 2004 to a final signature of the agreement in 2012, there were a creation of ad hoc 
negotiator groups, 10 rounds of negotiations of Colombia and Peru with the EU members and 
4 rounds of negotiations of Ecuador to join the Trade Agreement (Szegedy-Maszák 2009; 
European Union External Action Service 2016; Organization of American States Foreign Trade 
Information System 2016; European Commission 2015). As a result, there have seen a long 
lasting cooperation to reach the formation of interregional trade agreement.  
 
Bilateral trade 
 To begin with, I compare total trade flows between the European Union and Andean 
Community from 1993 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2012. This comparison is supposed to show 
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an impact of bilateral trade flows as an incentive for the formation of interregional trade 
agreement. Strikingly, it is worth emphasizing that trade gains is a reflection of opportunity 
costs in more conceptual terms, which means future benefits is than in status quo. This is a case 
for cooperation between the European Union and Andean Community, because a period of 
2004-2012 is more beneficial than a period of 1993-2003. 
 As seen from Figure 10, there is a gradual growth with some two declines in total trade 
in goods and services between the European Union and the Andean Community. From 1993 to 
1998 trade slightly went up from 95 million dollars to 105 million dollars respectively, however 
in 1999 it declined slightly less than 100 million dollars. In this period the parties have not 
agreements, which can facilitate commodity flows and providing services between each other. 
It seems to me that the decline in 1999 is connected with the crisis in Asia, which affected to 
some extent the rest of the world. Then there is line raising up from 2000 and consequently 
Figure 10. Total Trade between the European Union and the Andean Community. Source: The 
International Monetary Fund, the Direction of Trade Statistics  
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when the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2003, it quickly soared 
from 100 million dollars to 300 million dollars. I consider this sharp increase for almost three 
times as an effect of cooperation on bilateral trade, because in the Agreement of 2003, they set 
terms, which reduced trade barriers. The officials of both sides understood that this growth can 
be even more extends, if they form a comprehensive interregional trade agreement. Therefore, 
they fruitfully negotiated terms of new free trade agreement.  
 However, the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008 moderately negatively influenced 
total trade. The drop was not long and in 2009 it rocketed to almost 400 million dollars only in 
two year period 2011-2012. I suppose that it is a vivid example disclosing an effect of total 
trade on cooperation of actors. Leaders and businessmen seek for more market access and trade 
gains, which can be achieved by the formation of interregional trade agreement. In the period 
of passive dialogue 1993-2003 the European Union and Andean Community traded for about 
10535 billion dollars, while in the period of active negotiations 2004-2012 they had trade flows 
for 21740 billion dollars approximately. Moreover, it is worth pointing out the official meeting 
dedicated to signing of the EU-Andean Community trade agreement in June 26, 2012 in 
Brussels. There were several speeches of the officials from the European Union and Colombia 
and Peru. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht (European Commission 2012) said: 
I welcome today's signature of the Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru, which 
creates a stable framework to boost trade and investment between the EU and the Andean 
region. In times of economic crisis, increasing trade and investment is the way forward to 
create growth and jobs. The agreement establishes a foothold for European business in this 
rapidly growing area and an anchor for further structural reforms in both countries. 
 From this speech it is seen that the European Union hopes to enlarge cooperation in 
trade in the front of global economic crisis. In turn, Peruvian Trade and Tourism minister Silva 
supported (Peruvian Times 2012) partner’s inspiring statement: 
In the FTA with the United States, we are talking about bilateral trade of about $6 billion. 
In the case of Europe, it is almost 40 percent higher. As well, we are talking about a market 
where there are 500 million people with a high purchasing power. 
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 Clearly, the Peruvian minister demonstrated a huge importance and a high level of 
bilateral partnership in trade and investments by comparing the European Union and the United 
States. Thus, I suppose that the case of EU-Andean Community cooperation supports my 
argument that if there is a potential to expand trade flows, it is likely that parties form 
interregional trade agreement.  
 
Depth of integration 
 I claim that a quality of integration positively and significantly affects cooperation of 
trade blocs. The finding of the statistical part supported my assumption. In conceptual terms, 
as discussed earlier depth of bloc reflects both discount rate defining patience of actor in 
negotiations and opportunity costs determining future benefits. More integrated trade bloc is 
clearer in intents and can patiently negotiate over terms and conditions of agreement, if there 
are enough profits. It is turn to test the argument on case study of interregional cooperation 
between the European Union and the Andean Community.  
Figure 11. IAS Scores of the European Union and the Andean Community 
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 Figure 11 shows that both parties have a good level of integration in comparison with 
average IAS score of regional trade blocs, which is equal to 1.064. Initially, the Andean 
Community had 1.5 scores of integration in 1993, which rapidly soared to 2 scores in 1995. 
After 3 years it reached approximately 2.2 scores and has lasted till nowadays. Meantime, it is 
known that the European Union is deeply integrated regional bloc. In 1993, it was slightly 
above 3.3 IAS points. Then, integration quality increased sharply about to 3.7 scores in 1999. 
After stable three year period, coordination deepened even more, which is considered for 
slightly above 3.8 points. The European Union has possessed this amount of integration level 
till the end of the temporal domain of research in 2012 (Hufbauer and Schott 1994; Efird and 
Genna 2002; Efird and Genna 2003; Feng and Genna 2003; Genna and Hiroi 2004; Feng and 
Genna 2005; Geda and Kebret 2007; Genna 2011). It is seen that there is a correlation in their 
cooperation, because when both blocs had upgraded integration level in 1993, they concluded 
the Framework Cooperation agreement. Then they had deepened in 1995-1998, they signed the 
Declaration of Rome in 1996. In intersection of old and new millenniums, when third 
improvements of their integration had happened, they reached the Political Dialogue and 
Cooperation Agreement in 2003. As a peak for now, the European Union and Andean 
Community signed comprehensive trade agreement in 2012. 
 The depth of European Union’s and Andean Community’s integration supports 
Hypothesis 2, because both have considerably higher regional quality of coordination than 
trade blocs with mean scores. This factor triggered two blocs to cooperate, as they are more 
uniform in positions during the negotiation process and in their regional policies in the future. 
Consequently, these variables positively affect the formation of interregional trade agreement.  
 
A level of development and potential consumer capability 
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 I would like to test a role of development for bloc-to-bloc cooperation based on the case 
of the European Union and the Andean Community. Conceptually, cooperation with more 
developed bloc brings more benefits in comparison with less developed one. In so doing, 
opportunity costs is reflected through a level of development. The statistical analysis reveals a 
shortage of Hypothesis 3 by demonstrating its weak effect under robustness checks. Closer 
investigation on a case of interregional cooperation can help to explain it. 
 Figure 12 presents the averaged trade blocs’ and Andean Community’s GDP per capita 
in constant dollars as of 2005. I compare the Andean Community with other blocs, because it 
helps to understand a place of the former among the latters, while a place of the European 
Union surely is substantially higher. Moreover, I choose constant dollars instead of current 
dollars, because it takes into account inflation, devaluation and other financial mechanisms 
distorting a real picture of development level.  
Figure 12. GDP Per Capita in Constant Dollars (2005) of the Rest Regional Trade Blocs and 
the Andean Community. Source: the World Bank 
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 GDP per capita of the Andean Community started at 2100 dollars approximately in 
1993 and continued growth to 1997-1998, when the Asian Financial Crisis negatively affected 
other parts of the world. Then, a trend of GDP per capita gradually increased till the Global 
Financial Crisis, when it reached a stable plateau for two years in 2007-2008. Consequently, 
from that period increasing trend continued to 2012. Nevertheless, this positive trend is only in 
terms of the particular case, while in comparison with the rest of the globe, it is not so 
significant and unique. Also, it is worth noting that there are many regional trade blocs with 
similar indicators to the Andean Community’s ones. GDP per capita ranged from 500 dollars 
to 4000 dollars is very dense in the beginning of 1990s, while this trend has gone approximately 
up from 600 dollars to 5000 dollars in the 2010s. There are also some groups, which have 
higher GDP per capita than abovementioned dense group of trade blocs. For instance, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the ASEAN has considerably higher GDP per capita.  
 This implies that the Andean Community is not highly developed and indeed is below 
from average trade bloc existing in international arena. Hence a level of development is not a 
decisive factor for the European Union’s consideration whether to cooperate or not. It seems 
to me that the European Union simply has not extensive choices in choosing potential partners 
among trade blocs and due to this fact it establishes bilateral relations with available trade 
blocs. In this sense, the European Union cooperates with those players, with whom sees already 
good extent of trade gains, which has uniform coordination within a bloc and clear dispute 
history. However, it should necessarily stipulate that the European Union does not have 
consider a level of development, but it takes into account this information to less extent in 
comparison with other variables. Therefore, I suppose this example shows that the European 
Union is not deeply concerned with development level in the middle ranged blocs as the 
Andean Community and COMESA but still looks for future potential based on other criteria. 
As a result, a level of development does not affect interregional in a significant way.  
55 
 
 
 
 
Membership in the WTO 
 I argue that membership in the WTO positively affects bloc-to-bloc cooperation, 
because the WTO is an institution stipulating high and internationally recognized standards for 
trade, however, at the same time it faces stumbling blocks due to its huge size of membership. 
It is conceptually connected to opportunity costs, because if the WTO framework cannot solve 
problems, then the European Union and the Andean Community lose benefits. Therefore, trade 
blocs are inclined to form agreement with important partners directly, who are subject to the 
rules of the WTO. This assumption is supported by statistical part of the paper. 
 All members of the Andean Community became members of the WTO in 1996. In so 
doing, the Andean Community is on the top blocs, who participate in the WTO. Meanwhile, 
there are still many actors with much less membership scores among regional trade entities, 
which favored the Andean Community in the eyes of the European Union, which is also top 
possessor of membership score. Moreover, it is relevant mentioning that there were 
disagreements over opening market between developing and developed states, because the 
latter are disadvantaged in comparison with the latter before the Doha Round talks in 2001 
(Gallagher 2007). Developing states insisted on attention on development, while developed 
states wanted to widen markets for realization of its own made products. There were several 
round tables, which did not reach a consensus. Against the background of these processes, the 
Andean Community and the European Union had intention to evolve their partnership 
bilaterally.  
 
Disputes in the WTO 
 Hypothesis 4b claims that a dirty disputes history in the WTO negatively influences 
cooperation between blocs, because a violation of established rules and standards is considered 
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as a potential for reiteration of inconsistent behavior in the future. This is a genuine application 
of opportunity costs from conceptual terms in practice. The statistical part presented a 
supportive and significant evidences for this suggestion. Consequently, the case of the 
European Union and the Andean Community tests an effect of the disputes in the WTO. Firstly, 
I present a history of disputes between these two actors, because information on their behavior 
regarding each other directly affects further cooperation on bloc-to-bloc level. Secondly, there 
is a comparison of disputes between the Andean Community and overall world, because it 
shows a place of the former among global trends. 
  Firstly, the European Union and Andean Community had 4 disputes in total from 1995 
to 2012 between each other. Peru sued the European Union twice in 1995 and in 2001 with 
Cases DS12 and DS231 respectively. Ecuador brought one complaint against the European 
Union in 1996 by Case D27 on importation, sale and distribution of bananas. Colombia brought 
one suit against the European Union in 2007 by Case DS361 on regime for the importation of 
bananas. Meanwhile, Peru and the members of the European Union had not any trade disputes 
(The World Trade Organization 2015b). There are 3 complaints against the European Union 
from the Andean Community and no complaints against the Andean Community from the 
European Union. Thus, this clearly shows that generally they are satisfied and comply with the 
rules of the WTO excluding some minor cases. Mutual trust deriving from the history of 
bilateral relations was a firm foundation to cooperate further. In so doing, after active 
negotiations from 2003, a disagreement between both sides occurred only once in 2007, while 
before that it was 3 times.  
 Secondly, number of Andean Community’s disputes is common with average number 
of participations. Generally, blocs participated in disputes lower than 0.5 times in 1993-1997 
time period, but this trend gradually went up. The Andean Community had the same pattern, 
particularly they attended 0.25 times in disputes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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and then, the WTO. In 1998 no one member from the Andean Community participated whether 
as a respondent or a complainant. However, from 1999 to 2001 participation increased to 0.5 
times following global trends. Maximum of disputes was in 2003, when the Andean 
Community participated 1.25 times on average in trade disputes in the WTO. In subsequent 
years, a number of participations fluctuated between 0 and 0.5 times (The World Trade 
Organization, 2015b). In comparative terms, the Andean Community is not a frequent violator 
of rules, which signals to the European Union that the former is reliable and not inclined to 
break its commitments.  
 The case study reveals that bilateral trade, depth of integration, membership and dispute 
history in the WTO substantially affected blocs to seek for cooperation, while a level of 
development has a certain effect but still not significant. However, the officials emphasized 
only bilateral trade as a driving factor for interregional cooperation, while other factors are not 
mentioned. It seems very interesting, possibly other reasons were not be considered or they 
intentionally omitted to underline their importance, because it could negatively influence 
relations. The European Union and the Andean Community had a long and complicated 
background of relations from 1993 towards the formation of the interregional trade agreement 
in 2012 and it is very risky for both sides to uncover their calculation. Furthermore, this case 
study of the cooperation between the European Union and the Andean Community supports 
the findings of the statistical part.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
  
To summarize, I argue that bargaining theory through hypotheses above can explain a 
formation of interregional trade agreements. I suppose that conducted empirical tests by 
quantitative and qualitative methods support most of aforementioned assumptions. To reiterate, 
market access, trade gains, depth of integration within a trade bloc, a level of development, an 
effect of the WTO and a frequent disputes history in the WTO have affected blocs in 
establishing trade agreements between each other. Particularly, market access and trade gains 
are incentives to build up more sophisticated and profitable cooperation based on previous and 
current state of affairs between two blocs. Quality of integration within a trade bloc is an 
evident indicator to what extent it is a reliable and predictable partner. If a trade bloc is deeply 
integrated, it is more uniform in its foreign policy. Regarding the WTO, the institution is very 
complicated to response to problems quickly, which harms members of. Therefore, in order to 
have direct connection, trade blocs are seeking for cooperation between each other as an 
alternative option for the WTO. Furthermore, states engaging in the disputes of the WTO are 
considered as undesirable partners, which means that a regional trade bloc comprising of 
frequent violator-states or complainant-states are less attractive for cooperation.  
Overall, I believe that this paper contributes to the field of international political 
economy in a way that we have known internal mechanism of international trade. Before there 
were notable researches on preferential trade agreements and regional trade agreements, while 
there is no research devoted to interregional trade cooperation, particularly with theoretical 
argument on depth of integration and empirical testing of all variables on bloc-to-bloc 
cooperation. I suppose that this research is the first attempt to systemize knowledge on and 
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proposing general factors affecting interregional cooperation. After this, there is a possibility 
to conduct a research exploiting empirical methods of this work based on all blocs, which can 
demonstrate fuller picture taken the place behind interregional cooperation. 
Moreover, I suppose, that understanding of interregional trade agreements have useful 
political implications for policy-makers, political scientists and economists. They can use 
information of previous bilateral trade, depth of integration within a potential partner, its level 
of development and dispute history in the WTO, which can be helpful during the negotiations 
processes. Skillful negotiators can bargain over trade barriers by taking into account strengths 
and weaknesses of counterpart in these fields. Policy-makers should be especially concerned 
with choosing the most reliable and predictable partners in cooperation by paying attention to 
disputes history, as it has a direct influence on increasing economic prosperity and development 
of states consisting in trade blocs. Lastly, this topic is also important, as a scale of regional 
trade blocs are huge and cooperation between two blocs can lead to the substantial changes in 
a particular regions and afterwards in the world. 
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APPENDIX A 
I decided to present 2 typical cases, because it helps to construct more comprehensive 
picture of processes explained by the theory in the main part of the paper. Particularly, there is 
an analysis based on means of the variables. Nevertheless, there are two main categories of 
blocs, which should be demonstrated. Namely, on the one hand, a bloc with high indicators of 
the factors as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and on the other hand, a bloc with low 
indicators of the variables as the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreements (PICTA). 
 
Typical case – Mercosur 
 Looking at the case of interregional cooperation between the European Union and 
Mercosur is very interesting, because this instance demonstrates an extent of probability 
between blocs having a strong relationship and long-term interests. Mercosur is a trade bloc 
consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, which are considered as 
leading states in the Latin America and trade with the members of the European Union on high 
level. 
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Figure 13. Substantive Effects of Total Trade Flows in EU-Mercosur Cooperation 
 
 Figure 13 presents confidence intervals of total trade between the European Union and 
Mercosur. Generally, as total trade increases, predicted probability grows up and uncertainty 
shortens. When there is overall trade cost 80 billion dollars, predicted probability ranges 
between 0.90-0.98 meaning that uncertainty level is 0.08. Meanwhile, if there is 150 billion 
dollars in total trade, confidence intervals are located between 0.95-0.99, which implies that 
uncertainty level is equal to 0.04 approximately. In following values we observe a gradual 
growing tendency of probability and a considerable decreasing trend of uncertainty conditional 
on amount of total trade.  
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Figure 14. Substantive Effects of IAS Score in EU-Mercosur Cooperation 
 
 A predicted probability of integration between the European Union and Mercosur is 
shown by Figure 14. At 0 IAS score confidence interval varies between 0.25-0.98, 
consequently we are uncertain in this for 0.74 about. In following value, 1 IAS score, predicted 
probability shortens considerably and ranges from 0.80 to 0.99 approximately. Also, 
uncertainty level decreases and equals to 0.19. At the highest score, 3, a probability is almost 
about 1 without uncertainty. This tendency evidently supports the argument claiming that as 
integration of bloc deepens, a chance to form cooperation goes up. 
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Figure 15. Substantive Effects of GDP Per Capita in Current Dollars in EU-Mercosur 
Cooperation 
 
 Figure 15 is supposed to show predicted probability of development level on 
interregional cooperation between the European Union and Mercosur. As seen from the graph, 
if there is 3000$ GDP per capita, then predicted probability varies between 0.91-0.96, while if 
there is 9000$ GDP per capita, probability slightly diminishes to 0.97-0.99. In the former 
uncertainty level is only 0.05, while in the latter it is 0.02 approximately. In following values, 
probability reaches almost 1 and uncertainty decreases to 0. As hypothesized earlier, as a level 
of development grows up, a probability of the interregional agreement increases.  
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Figure 16. Substantive Effects of WTO Membership in EU-Mercosur Cooperation 
 
 Predicted probability on the effect of membership in the WTO shows a supportive 
evidence for the theory in Figure 16. If there is no membership in the WTO, then predicted 
probability ranges from 0 to 0.23. So, there is approximately 0.23 uncertainty. Meantime, if 
there is 1 score of membership, then predicted probability varies only between 0.90-1, which 
means that we are uncertain in this outcome for 0.10. Thus, it can be said that Mercosur has a 
high chance to cooperate with the European Union, if all its states are members of the WTO. 
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Figure 17. Substantive Effects of WTO Respondents in EU-Mercosur Cooperation  
 
 Figure 17 demonstrates predicted probability of participation in the WTO disputes as a 
respondent in case of the European Union and Mercosur cooperation. If there is no case of 
being respondents in the WTO, then a trade bloc as Mercosur has a probability ranged between 
0.90-1 with 0.10 uncertainty level. Notably, if a trade bloc has 1 case of being respondent, then 
probability widely varies from 0.01 to 0.90. Uncertainty level is very high valued for 0.89. 
However, if there are 2 cases, then confidence intervals drastically shorten and varies between 
from 0 to 0.25 with 0.25 uncertainty approximately. In subsequent values as 3, 4 and 5 cases 
of participation as a respondent predicted probability equals almost to 0 without any uncertainty 
level. In so doing, this typical based on values of Mercosur underpins the overarching 
hypothesis on a negative influence of being respondents in the WTO on the formation of 
interregional trade agreement. 
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Figure 18. Substantive Effects of WTO Complainants in EU-Mercosur Cooperation 
 
 By Figure 18 I have objective to show a predicted probability of WTO complainants on 
interregional trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. If there is absence 
of complainants from a trade bloc as Mercosur, it is highly likely to form arrangement, because 
its predicted probability varies between 0.90-1 with 0.10 uncertainty. If there are 2 cases of 
being complainant, then, confidence intervals widens from 0.40 to 0.99 with 0.59 uncertainty 
level. If there are 4 complainants in WTO dispute history, then probability is ranged between 
0.03-0.92 with 0.89 uncertainty level. Meanwhile, if there are maximum participations as 7 
times, then predicted probability is even more deteriorated, because confidence intervals 
determines them as from 0 to 0.80. Taken into account this gradual decreasing trend of the 
probability, I would say that it supports the theory.  
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APPENDIX B 
Typical case –PICTA 
 After examination of Mercosur as a representative of more inclined regional bloc to 
cooperation, it is beneficial to analyze a case of less inclined one. Particularly, cooperation 
between the European Union and PICTA. PICTA is a regional trade bloc comprised of Fiji, 
Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
situated in the Pacific Ocean. Due to their low level of development and weak relationship with 
the European Union, there are only few chances for formation of interregional trade agreement. 
Figure 19. Substantive Effects of Total Trade Flows in EU-PICTA Cooperation 
 
 Figure 19 presents predicted probability of cooperation based on total trade between the 
European Union and PICTA. If there is total trade cost 80 billion dollars, then confidence 
intervals approximately vary between 0.01-0.05 with 0.04 uncertainty level. In case of 150 
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billion dollars bilateral trade, then probability ranges from 0.02 to 0.10 meaning that there is 
0.08 uncertainty level. In subsequent value 210 billion dollars we observe slightly extending 
of uncertainty level to 0.17 between 0.03-0.20 confidence intervals. Generally, there is 
increasing trend of probability but with a huge degree of uncertainty. This implies that we 
cannot surely state that the European Union and PICTA will cooperate. 
Figure 20. Substantive Effects of IAS Score in EU-PICTA Cooperation 
 
 Figure 20 is constructed to show predicted probability of depth based on the case of 
collaboration between the European Union and PICTA. If there is 0 IAS score, then probability 
is equal 0, which can be said without uncertainty level. The same pattern is relevant, if there is 
an integration labeled by 1 IAS score. Meanwhile, if a trade bloc has integration equal to 2 IAS 
score, then there is a growth in probability varying between 0.01-0.03 about with 0.02 
uncertainty level. At the highest point of IAS score, we observe confidence intervals varying 
between 0.02-0.07 with 0.05 uncertainty level. Although, in terms of whole scale, surely, these 
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numbers are very low, there is an increasing trend of probability conditioned on a growth of 
integration level as mentioned in the theory. 
Figure 21. Substantive Effects of GDP Per Capita in Current Dollars in EU-PICTA 
Cooperation 
 
There is a predicted probability of cooperation between the European Union and PICTA based 
on former’s development level in Figure 21. A trade bloc as PICTA with 5000$ and 10000$ 
GDP per capita almost does not have a chance to form trade agreement with the European 
Union. A bloc with 18000$ has a slightly more probability ranging between 0.03-0.07 with 
0.04 uncertainty. In following values, there is an increasing tendency in probability and 
uncertainty as well. For instance, at 30000$ probability varies from 0.03 to 0.73 with 0.70 
uncertainty. Overall, as a level of development goes up, a probability of cooperation increases, 
however uncertainty increases as well.  
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Figure 22. Substantive Effects of WTO Membership in EU-PICTA Cooperation 
 
 Figure 22 demonstrates predicted probability of cooperation between the European 
Union and PICTA based on membership of PICTA in the WTO. If no one state of PICTA is a 
member, then probability almost equals to 0 without uncertainty. If all members participate in 
the WTO, then observe a growth of probability but with increasing uncertainty level as well. 
Particularly, confidence intervals vary from 0.01 to 0.38 with 0.37 uncertainty. This 
observation is in compliance with the hypothesis claiming that as a membership in the WTO 
increases, cooperation increases. 
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Figure 23. Substantive Effects of WTO Respondents in EU-PICTA Cooperation 
 
 Here I interpret a probability of the European Union and PICTA’s bilateral cooperation 
based on PICTA’s participation in the WTO disputes as a respondent in Figure 23. It is clearly 
shown that in all numbers of being respondents a trade bloc as PICTA does not have a chance 
to form agreement with the EU. Moreover, uncertainty level is absent in all values.  
 As in case of WTO respondents, participation in the WTO disputes equals to zero a 
chance of PICTA for formation of trade agreement with the European Union. Figure 24 shows 
a stable tendency on 0 predicted probability in all values of WTO complainants. Hence, this 
means that PICTA or other similar trade bloc certainly cannot cooperate with the European 
Union. 
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Figure 24. Substantive Effects of WTO Complainants in EU-PICTA Cooperation 
 
 I analyzed two cases, the Mercosur and PICTA, where the former is taken as most 
progressive bloc, while the latter represents least developed bloc. The comparison shows that 
the Mercosur has more chances to cooperate with the European Union in all components, while 
PICTA has considerably less chances to form interregional trade agreement. The effects of the 
explanatory variables in both cases evidently are demonstrated in significant way.  
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